The indisputable success of the European integration project also prompted other regions of the world to follow suit. On the other side of coin, these regional blocs cultivated free trade within but remained protectionist vis-à-vis the outside, thereby impeding the progress of the multilateral trade system. But also the soaring number of WTO member states accompanied by their incompatible interests, its ambitious agenda spanning over 20 diverse issues and, in particular, the single undertaking approach emerged as the Doha's Round "stumbling blocks". The utter dismay over the Doha's Round deadlock has provoked countries to opt for alternative for a outside the WTO in their endeavor to expedite far-reaching trade liberalization. Besides the vast economic growth in Asia and the rise of international production networks, this urge for deeper integration represents one of the central root causes for the most recent wave of PTAs which has been gathering force over the course of the 21 st century and increasingly puts the WTO's raison d'être under critical scrutiny.
Introduction
MacDougall already postulated in 1951 that a state which owns a comparative advantage in productivity of a specific commodity might nonetheless fail to assert itself on a foreign market because of tariff-and non-tariff barriers to trade (MacDougall, 1951) ]. The surge of regional blocs since the 1960s is in that sense to be accredited to their astounding achievements in internal trade liberalization, stimulating product differentiation synonymous with intra-industry trade. This contention veritably resonates withthe scientific literature which universally suggests that productivity, income and consumption are closely linked tomarket size, trade openness and tighter economic integration (Alesina et al., 1997 , Rivera-Batiz et al., 1990 . The European Union for instance, whose roots date back to the aftermath of the 2 nd World War, accomplisheda quantum leap in integration through the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, paving the way for the launch of its own currency. The EU represents todays the most integrated free trade area due to its free movement of goods, persons, services and capital. Particularly export-oriented countries such as Germany count amongst the beneficiaries of the consequential surge in intra-continental exchanges on the premise of these so-called "Four Freedoms".
About the origins of multilateralism
The notion of multilateralism, curiously though it may seem, originates in the nineteenth century intra-European bilateralism, more precisely in the attempts by industrialized Britain to put its trade relations with other nations on non-discriminatory bases. Yet the reasons underlying Britain's efforts were not primarily ethical but rather stemmed from the fear of a continental conspiracy against the Albion, due to the latter's considerable advance in the industrialization race. The British's concern was not groundless: their export sof both agricultural and industrial goods were dominating European and overseas markets, posing a serious threat to host countries' infant industries that were therefore desperately demanding protection at frontier. The danger for Britain therefore lay in the possibility that countries on the continent that felt threatened by the British commercial strength should attempt to insulate themselves from the former's influence by mutually granting commercial preferences to each other, while keeping high barriers against British exports. Such a collusion could well have been orchestrated by France, then Europe's most powerful economy and Britain's chief rival.
Practically, Britain's trade policy was pursuing two chief objectives, that is, the triumph of free trade throughout Europe and beyond -which was obviously in its advantage -respectively signing a mutual treaty with France that should guarantee that the latter would not treat other nations more favorably in terms of commercial concessions. The first objective "had become a central orthodoxy of British politics, almost as entrenched as the Protestant succession." (Matthew, 1992) . The second one is suggestively explained by Grossman: "Governments relinquish their sovereign rights to choose their own trade (and other) policies in exchange for similar concessions by others. Why might a government be willing to compromise its sovereignty? In a word, the answer is interdependence… With unilateral policy choices, governments may fail to take into account the impact of their actions on interests abroad. A trade agreement provides a means to internalize these externalities." (Grossman, 1993 )Therefore, to reach the second objective, the commercial treaty with France included the most favored nation (MFN) clause, meaning that "every time a country lowers a trade barrier or opens up a market, it has to do so for the same goods or services from all its trading partners -whether rich or poor, weak or strong." (WTO, 2015) The outstanding novelty of the MFN clause lay in that it eliminated the necessity of renegotiation in case one signatory would offer commercial concessions, e.g. tariffs reduction, removal of nontariff barriers etc., to any third party. The respective concessions would automatically extend over the other signatory.
The commercial treaty between Britain and France aka CobdenChevalier Treaty made history. As it was to be expected, a host of other nations followed suit so that in less than two decades many similar treaties were already in force all over Europe and beyond. Yet for all the nonnegligible progress in the fight against discrimination they represented, the MFN-bound treaties were just a stepping stone toward multilateralism. Bilateral understandings that prevented countries to discriminate against one another were no guarantee that they would not strike off the opposite way, namely to impose more restrictive measures against imports. Unfortunately, this is what happened during the last three decades of the nineteenth century. The world trade was seized by a protectionist fever that would sweep away all the headway that had been made until then with respect to trade liberalization. One after another, governments of all countries except Britain embarked upon protectionist programs embodied in excessively high import tariffs and other restrictive measures against imports.
The offensive against free trade spanned three quarters of a century, with ups and downs, from Germany's political unification in the early 1870s until the end of the Second World War. This period comprised two stages: in the first stage, spanning the last three decades of the nineteenth century, nations were keen to boost their infant industries by sheltering them from the competitive pressure of the more advanced British industries. In the second stage, especially after the Great Depression of 1929-33 protectionist policies were meant to insulate national economies from the harmful effects of the bust. In either case, protectionist policies translated intonations'self-closing into their own carapace, thereby triggering a decline in international trade. In the aftermath of the Great Depression for example, the volume of international trade was at a dramatically low level relative to the pre-crisis period. "By the third quarter of 1932 the value of world trade was less than 35 per cent of that in the corresponding quarter of 1929; this decline was made up of a fall in average prices of about 50 per cent and a reduction of some 25 per cent in the quantum of goods traded." (Aldcroft, 1993) By the end of the Second World War, the world economy was in such dire straits that further economic growth was no longer possible, even for the United States (US), whose economy had emerged unscathed from the war. Protectionism was a cancer that gnawed the basis of the world economy in that it hampered commercial exchanges among nations. Paradoxically, despite the situation generating widespread discontent, no individual government was willing to make the first step in terms of tariffs reduction. Everybody expected the others to act, despite the norms of the classical theory of commercial policy (also supported by neoclassic thinkers) "that a notion would profit most by pursuing a free trade policy and that this was so whether its trading partners were free traders or protectionists." (Bhagwati, 1988) In principle, economists agree that the efficiency of imposing trade restrictions depends on the market power of a country. (Hoekman, Kostecki, 2002) In case of small countries, which cannot influence prices on world markets, the removal of barriers to trade through multilateral negotiations is beneficial. Moreover, "such countries should pursue liberalization unilaterally." (Hoekman, Kostecki, 2002) It was the endless haggling over who was supposed to kick off the tariffs lowering process that brought multilateralism to the fore: multilateral negotiations among all the nations -under the aegis of a widely recognized forum e.g. a general accord or an international organization -was considered the unique chance of breaking the deadlock and giving further impetus to international trade. As it was to be expected, since most nations, industrialized and developing, were reluctant to unilaterally dismantle trade barriers, it was the US that started off the "game" by providing the "the ideology and the political and material support." (Bhagwati, 1988) Multilateralism is beneficial, firstly, because it entails "reciprocity in trade liberalization negotiations", which responds to the general wish that governments should be "moving together in opening up their markets to import competition." (WTO, 2003) Secondly, nations' cooperation within a "system of binding international rights", can diminish their firms' transaction costs deriving from "producing and doing business across frontiers"; "cooperative arrangements can produce more harmonized approaches in such areas as standards and technical regulations." (WTO, 2003) Thirdly, "a shared commitment among trading partners to specify ex ante the terms and conditions upon which products may be sold in their markets can give a significant boost to trade". (WTO, 2003) And above all, multilateralism offers a big political chance to governments in small economies: it "allows them to offset opposition to liberalization on the part of import-competing industries…"
Why multilateralism has not endured
Due to its indisputable advantages, described earlier, as well as to its perfect timing, multilateralism has had an outstanding contribution to the post-Second World War trade liberalization process.Average tariffs at the time of the GATT's founding in 1947 were "situated in a range between 20 and 30 per cent"; after the 8 th Uruguay Round, concluded in 1994, the level dropped to below 5 percent. (Bown, Irwin, 2015) Besides, no less impressive was the surge in the number of participating countries. If at the first Geneva Round, held in 1947, negotiations were carried out among 23 participating countries, the Doha Round reunion held in Hong Kong in 2005 gathered 150 nations. 7 It was these remarkable achievements that paved the way for the final establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO), an ambitious undertaking that had failed in the 1940s, to become possible fifty years after. Yet instead of the expected reinforcement of multilateralism, the coming into being of the WTO produced the adverse effect: the multilateralism notion has got in retreat ever since. The explanation of this change in outlook is not straightforward: why, after having walked a long way on the path of trade liberalization, an increasing number of WTO-member countries began to question the viability of multilateral trade talks?
Basically, there are several causes for which general trust in multilateralism has been eroding steadily. One important cause resides in the system's own weaknesses, some of which have been manifest ever since its inception in 1947: the actions, initiated and actively promoted by the US, to adopt the Havana Charter -the legal foundation for a projected International Trade Organization -were blocked by the very US Congress that refused several times to ratify it, mostly under the pressure of businesses' lobby. The latter "balked at supporting an international organization with wide-ranging regulatory authority over trade, investment, and business practices." (Irwin, 1993) The bottom line is that the US have played a rather contradictory role: on the one hand, they strongly supported the creation of the GATT, prompting the other nations to abide by its principles and rules; on the other hand, the US conspicuously distrust the system: they have turned against WTO's Dispute Settlement Body on more than one occasion, considering the latter's rulings that were not in US's favor, biased. Besides, beginning with the 1980s, the US's trade policy veered toward (often aggressive) unilateralism, promoting restrictive measures against their main rivals, especially Japan and South Korea, accused of disloyal practices on the US market (e.g. dumping, export subsidies etc.) and unfair closing of their own markets to US exports.
A second cause lies in the much-taunted inefficiency of the multilateral trade talks that derives, ironically, from the very great number of participants, which makes it awfully hard to reach an agreement. Furthermore, agreements arrived at can be easily circumvented by national governments, who may take domestic measures that conceal protectionist intentions. "To make agreements work there has to be some kind of quasijudicial process that determines when ostensibly domestic measures are de facto a re-imposition of trade barriers and hence a violation of treaty." (Krugman, 2003) Indeed, the staffed organizational body working in Geneva did not possess efficient levers to prevent member-countries from ignoring or by-passing the treaty rules. Under WTO, the process has become "swifter and more decisive" (Krugman, 2003) , but still, the decisions can be challenged due to the organization's lack of political power. This last weakness has fueled the growing influence of NGO's upon participating nations. NGO's meddling into the discussions is a hotly debated issue, namely whether NGO's participation in negotiations is, ultimately, constructive or disruptive. According to certain authors (Rugman, 2000) the mere NGO's access to the debates has had bad effects upon the negotiations because, the author argues, although they ostensibly act on behalf of the developing nations, their influence works contrary to the latter's interests. On the other hand, reportedly, legions of poor nations lack the capacity to defend their interests within the negotiations, for which reason they need consulting support from NGO's.
A third cause lies in the relentless quarrel over agriculture. Negotiations to reduce protection for agricultural goods are by far more cumbersome than those for industrial ones. Paradoxically, despite the incontestable certainty (proven by theorists) that the freer the trade in agricultural goods the lower the latter's price on the world's markets -which obviously would be a way of alleviating poverty -nations, both industrialized and developing, have grown ever more stubborn to maintain trade barriers to imports of such goods. Curiously though it may seem, the developed nations have turned out to be the most inflexible in this respect. After the conclusion of the Uruguay Round in 1994, the weighted average level of MFN-bound tariff protection against imports of agricultural goods, in force in the chief developed nations, was as follows: 8.8 percent for the US; 30.4 percent for Canada; 32.6 percent for the EU; 76.4 percent for Japan. (Cline, 2004) In addition to tariffs, farm subsidies contribute substantially to agricultural protection. Under the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA), levels of farm subsidies were bound, and countries committed to reducing these levels over time. (Cline, 2004 ) Seven years after, that is upon the onset of the last Doha Round, no notable progress had been scored in terms of compliance with the URAA commitments.
Agricultural protectionism is indeed a hard nut to crack in multilateral negotiations. Protection measures are intended to prevent ailing agricultural sectors -which are to be found in every country of the world -from being hurt by foreign competition. And yet, there is a great difference between industrialized and developing nations from this point of view: whereas rich countries can afford to subsidize moribund sectors because they extract offsetting revenues from many other efficient ones, poor countries cannot, because the supported sectors are lifelines, namely unique sources of revenues and jobs. The Japanese rice is an illustrative case in point: the estimated tariff level for the protection of rice in Japan is about 400 percent, which makes this commodity many times more expensive for the Japanese consumer than, say, the Cambodian rice. Yet Japan has never shown the slightest intention to lower the tariff for rice protection. Japanese rice growers must be very grateful to their government for this huge favour they have been long enjoying. Nobody cares because expensive rice will not render the Japanese people worse off. By comparison, in a poor country, things work the other way around: high protection for agricultural products does mean more jobs for people employed in farming, which is an important social segment but still only a segment (larger or smaller); yet people at large will suffer from expensive food. This is a recipe for increasing poverty.
Regional blocs' protectionism
The irrefutable success of the European integration project also incited other regions of the world to follow suit in the early 1990s, exemplified by NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement), Mercosur (Common Market of the South) or ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations). In particular the EU's trade distorting effects, as well as their apprehension of no longer being able to keep pace with the world market, put those corresponding countries on the spot (Brzoska, 2016) . A regional bloc's inception therefore elicits sort of an avalanche effect since excluded countries either succumb to the pressure of inclusion or respond by creating their very own group (Winters, 1999 , Lawrence, 1996 , Nordstrom, 1995 . Krugman (1991) also acknowledges regionalism as a natural and mutually beneficial policyon mere grounds of transportation costs. Governments, businesses and residents of adjacent countries display, by the same token, a high propensity to aspire to coinciding objectives. This in turn constitutes a pivotal premise for cross-border alignment of regulatory provisions concerning investment, competition policy, intellectual property rights (IPR), services, environmental standards and labor rights (Sampson et al., 2003 , Kaya, 2006 . Whilenon-tariff barriers to trade such as divergent technical standards or conformance assessment are dismantled through harmonization or mutual recognition, those obstacles yet persist to hamper market access of foreign suppliers from non-member states. I believe that regional blocs literally cultivated free trade inside but remained protectionist vis-à-vis the outside. Inter-regional exchanges are hence severely impeded by regional blocs' protectionism against third parties. By tapping into their augmented market size, regional blocs become consequentiallyless dependent on foreign trade with the latter. Messerlin (1983) even bluntly alleges that incentives for bureaucrats, who ordinarily forge those unions, tend in actual fact towards protectionism. He would have found a kindred spirit in Guzman (2001) , stating that "it is only necessary to assume that governments and regulators favor their own constituents over foreigners, a reasonable assumption that is present in virtually any model of country behavior". The EU with its over 500 million consumers serves hereby as a prime example since two-thirds of its total trade occurs between its current 28 member states (BMWi, 2015) . As a rule of thumb, smaller countries benefit more from trade openness than large ones (Alesina et al., 1997) .
Is hall also scrutinize this issue through the prism of the "terms-oftrade" which specifies the relative price of imports in terms of exports or rather the amount of imported goods an economy can acquire per unit of exported goods (Reinsdorf, 2009 , Obstfeld et al., 1996 . Large economies are in contrast to relatively small ones capable of influencing prices on a global scale. According to Johnson (1953) they cannot resist the temptation to impose import duties in an attempt to induce favorable terms-of-trade and profit shifting effects. "The desire to capture rents is ubiquitous, porkbarrel politics and logrolling happen wherever institutional structures permit" (Clark et al., 2000) . By harnessng its respective market power in a non-cooperative manner, a regional bloc can, ceteris paribus, improve its terms-of-trade through restricting free trade. Already 30 years ago, Princeton University professor Robert Gilpin (1987) intriguingly ascribed his prophesied collapse of the multilateral trade system largely to entrenched protectionism, resting upon economic regionalism. Other pessimistic analysts for instance even associated the creation of the 1993 Single Market with an insurmountably "Fortress Europe" (Scherpenberg, 1991) .
For the sake of impartial scientific discourse, I shall complementarily expound the terms-of-trade-driven Prisoners' Dilemma, a situation where terms-of-trade enhancing policies pursued by all actors culminate in a contraction of overall trade volume and aggregate welfare which ultimately leaves everybody worse off (Bagwell et al., 1999 , Ossa, 2014 .
Multilateral negotiations: now moribund?
I intend to demonstrate that regional blocs' protectionism also rates among the preeminent causes of the failure of multilateral talks in the realm of the WTO. The preceding GATT achieved a remarkable feat over a period of almost 50 years as it moderated within eight rounds of multilateral negotiations the slashing of average tariffs on industrial goods to below 4 percent (Bagwell et al., 2016 ). Yet ironically, plummeting duties did not necessarily dispel protectionism per se because countries have steadily shifted away from tariff-to non-tariff barriers to trade.
The liberalization process, which had been unfolding under the aegis of GATT, has ground to halt with the ninth series in form of the so-called Doha Development Round, after all. The ever-lasting Doha Roundinitiated in the eponymous Qatari city at the fourth Ministerial WTO Conference on November 9-13, 2001 -besides further market opening, basically aims at a better position of developing nations in the world trading system. To this end, its ambitious agenda encompasses a broad range of issues such as improved market access for agricultural products and services, facilitation of customs procedures, environmental protection, elimination of behind-the-border measures, special treatment for emerging economies and so forth (WTO, 2017a). Overall, more than 20 subjects are negotiated on in parallel in the framework of a single package, to be approved by each WTO member nation with an overarching signature (WTO, 2017c). While the GATT was founded by only 23 countries in 1947, the WTO membership has in the interim already skyrocketed to a staggering 164 by the end of 2017, though (WTO, 2017f) . This soaring number of member states, characterized by opposing interests depending on their development status, has, in our onion, rendered it increasingly difficult to identify a common denominator when it comes to multilateral negations (BMZ, 2014 , FAZ, 2014 . In this respect, an apposite quoteby the WTO's former Director-General Pascal Lamy reads as follows: "The world faces global problems but only has local governments" (Spiegel, 2007) .
The balance of powers in the world economy has moreover experienced an inimitable shift towards developing countries, exemplified by China, India, Indonesia, Brazil, etc. (Ehrl, 2013) . We may deduce that along with this bolstered political clout, their aspiration to enforce their own national interests grew quite naturally. Those are on top of everything far more heterogenic today than ever before (Goerg et al., 2015) . Scholars therefore aptly picture multilateralism as an "arena cluttered with a cacophony of voices" (Bhagwati, 1999) or "a leaderless system with no clear direction that has unified the key members" (Erixon, 2013) .
The conclusion of the Doha Round is additionally impeded by the single undertaking approach, which constitutes, apart from the WTO's foundation on January 1, 1995 one of the salient innovations adopted by the Uruguay Round (WTO, 2017d). This concept, which was actually intended to deprive individual countries from cherry picking, unlike the previous "GATT à la carte", declares decisions on individual subject matters only compulsory once a consensus on all negotiation issues is reached (Center et al., 2007 , Dadush et al., 2015 . It is certainly not farfetched that this approach figuratively emerged as the Doha's Round stumbling block, considering its universal compendium spanning over 20 diverse subjects, to be holistically approved by each of the presently 164 WTO member nations. Not only has the reconciliation on utterly sensitive issues such as agricultural subsidies posed a major challenge but also the close intertwining of these themes severely complicates proceeding along the lines of negotiation piecemeal (Conselium, 2013) .
It already transpired during the WTO's first ministerial round in Singapore in 1996, that especially the large newly industrializing countries were not prepared, at least not without substantial quid pro quo, to open the sector of public procurement to international competition, to strengthen investment protection as well as restricting the room for maneuver in terms of state enterprises and subsidies. However, developed economies did not grant these demanded concessions such as the opening of their agricultural markets in return (Khor, 2002 , Meunier, 2004 . Taking all these massive obstacles into account, it is not surprising that the Doha Round, which reignited these so-called Singapore issues amongst many others, failed its initially envisaged completion date at the turn of the year 2004/2005 but is metaphorically languishing, considering its latest manifestation in form of the Buenos Aires conference on December 10-13, 2017 (WTO, 2017b .
The eleventh Ministerial Conference, convened in the Argentinian capital, ended in utter distress without a single substantial deal being struck (Mayeda, 2017) . The trade body's 164 members fell short of reaching full consensus on any of its proclaimed objectives, let alone the issuance of a joint final declaration (Zeit, 2017) Even the conference's declared minimal goal, an agreement on proscribing subsidies that contribute to the illegal overfishing of oceans, did not materialize (Mayeda, 2017) . The disillusioned WTO Secretary General Acevédo understandably condemned the lack of flexibility among individual negotiating partners (Zeit, 2017) . Albeit its currently critical stance, it was not the US alone that could be blamed for the trade talks' stalemate as EU Trade Commissioner Cecilia Malmström scolded also other nations for their blockade mentality and willingness to cynically hold the entire WTO hostage for their demands (Moses, 2017) . The German delegate Matthias Machnig, who in hindsight overtly announced a sobering "low point in the history of the WTO", not only shared his perspective but even endorsed the US' criticism of the WTO for giving "unfair advantages to self-proclaimed developing countries", which in actual fact rank among the world's largest economies (Moses, 2017 , Zeit, 2017 . Against this backdrop, the Europeans, Americans and Japanese into the bargain rebuked severe excess capacity in key sectors, market distorting subsidies, and policies that force companies to transfer their proprietary technologies abroad, though without explicitly naming the Chinese in their collective statement (Mayeda, 2017) .
As a final conclusion of the negotiations is thus highly improbable to materialize in the near future, major players like the US or the EU are on the lookout for alternative for a outside the WTO to stipulate new conventions on international trade (Brzoska, 2016) . In this light, the US had already recognized preferential trade agreements (PTAs) as an alternate instrument already before theturn of the millennium, when former EU Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy contrastingly still extolled WTO guided multilateralism as the very only route towards trade liberalization (Langhorst, 2007) . However, it did not take long for the European's trade policy to catch up in form of its 2006 publication "Global EuropeCompeting in the world" (Fuchs, 2007) . This realigned strategy acknowledges PTAs as an auspicious option which enable to "proceed faster and further in promoting openness and integration" than is presently the case with multilateral talks involving all WTO member states (EC, 2006).
PTAs' compatibility with multilateral principles
As a first step, we shall distinguish between multilateral and preferential trade agreements. The former are characterized by the principles of reciprocity, "most-favored-nation" (MFN) and national treatment (Dietrich, 2014) . The principle of reciprocity implies that if country A renders trade concessions to country B, then country B is obliged to grant country A a congruous return, thus ensuring mutually balanced negotiations. The MFN principle connotes the credo "favor one, favor all": If a country concedes certain privileges and perquisites to one trading partner, it is basically bound to expand those to all other states under the auspices of the multilateral agreement. The national principle stipulates that foreign goods and services must not be treated differently to domestic ones, thereby forestalling discrimination for the sake of equitable international trade. In addition, the number of signatory states is supposed to be as large as possible in multilateral agreements.
PTAs on the other hand offer a more readily attainable alternative, where a country or bloc negotiates unique further reaching liberalization exclusively with selected partners (van der Marel, 2013) . This entails a colorful potpourri of single agreements, whose bedrock is mostly grounded on WTO provisions, though apart from some intersections the PTAs often differ significantly from one another. They are not only limited to countries within a single geographical region, for which reason we shall wittingly use the generic term PTA, encompassing regional, bilateral and pluri-lateral agreements altogether. From a trade ethics' perspective, PTAs intrinsically undermine one of the GATT's core principles, namely non-discrimination. The covenant was not withstandingly subjected to the incorporation of a contentious special clause (article XXIV, paragraph 4) due to the growing popularity of preferential arrangements. It confers contracting parties the right to form customs unions and free trade areas with another member state as long as they adhere to the economic reasoning and vaguely affirms that these agreements do not contradict the GATT's notion per se (Temesio, 2015) . The latter furthermore patently permits deliberate exemptions to emerging economies (WTO, 2017f, Herrmann, 2008 , Herrmann, 2013 .
Three waves of PTAs in modern times
The GATT's inception in 1947 did not curtail the appeal of bilateral or regional approaches to international trade relations. Quite the opposite, if the mid-nineteenth century engendered the first heyday of PTAs, the last 70 years have witnessed another three waves, each being fueled by diverse nations' craving to go "further and faster" than the present multilateral system in order to attain "deeper" trade integration (Carpenter, 2009 ). Belgium's, France's, Italy's, Luxembourg's, the Netherlands' and West Germany's strive for continental integration evoked the very first wave, washing ashore the advent of the European Economic Community (EEC) by the Treaty of Rome in 1957 and its subsequent expansion via the 1973 accession of Denmark, Ireland and the UK (Anderson et al., 1993) .
Also, the second wave of PTAs was unleashed from the European continent as it embarked on its "Single Market" program which prepared the ground for the ECC's transformation into the European Community (EC) by virtue of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993. The European Economic Area (EEA) was moreover established on January 1, 1994, closing of ranks between the then seven nations of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and the former twelve EC member states (Ziegler, 2002) , while three erstwhile members of the EFTA-Austria, Finland and Swedeneventually acceded to the EU precisely one year later. Besides, the mid1990s put forth numerous European bilateral agreements with Middle Eastern (Israel, Jordan, Lebanon) and North African (Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia) countries (WTO, 2011 , Sapir, 2000 . The EC, whose institutions were ultimately absorbed into the EU's wider body in 2009 whereby the community ceased to exist, additionally ushered in the integration of Central and Eastern European nations by means of a new cluster of bilateral PTAs amidst the Soviet Union's collapse (Lester et al., 2009 , Gabel, 2018 . Those efforts proved fruitful soon after, when eventually ten of these states (Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia), followed by Romania as well as Bulgaria and last but not least Croatia were admitted into the EU in , respectively(EU, 2018 .
The impetus behind this second wave was not only released from the EU but also from the US, provoked by its frustration with the sluggish progress of the Uruguay Round and its apprehension of the trade distorting effects caused by the EU's coinciding enlargement program (Fiorentino et al., 2007) . Having previously eschewed PTAs for the sake of multilateralism, the US hence abruptly altered its strategy in a pursuit of bilateralism which promptly yielded a free trade agreement with Israel in 1985 and the CUSTA (Canada-US Free Trade Agreement) in 1988 (Anderson and Blackhurst, 1993) . The latter subsequently even trilateralized to include Mexico with in the NAFTA that intriguingly entered into force on the very same date as the former EEA (Kerr, 2001) .
With an at least theoretically great potential and associated signal effect, the MERCUSOR (Southern Common Market) -dovetailing Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay -became effective on November 29, 1991 as yet another important regional free trade area back then (Ziegler, 2002) . This treaty most probably claims a pioneering role in a new generation of "developing-developing country" PTAs, leveraging a more unified and powerful voice for the Latin American partners on the multilateral playing field (Mansfield et al., 2000) . Regionalism also gained momentum in Asia during this period, when ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) signatories set up the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) in 1992 with the ambition to reinforce their resilience to economic crises and to boost their competitive edge as a production base in the world market through the elimination of internal tariffs and non-tariff barriers (Breuss, 2005 , Brzoska, 2016 .
In summary, the world witnessed an unprecedented proliferation in regional trade agreements in the early 1990s, attributed to prevalent concerns about an impending failure of the Uruguay Round and ensuing potential collapse of the rules based multilateral trading system altogether (Sampson and Woolcock, 2003, Crawford et al., 2005) . Facing this distressing future outlook, countries were providently installing their own safety nets on a regional basis. Another decisive rationale for these treaties was that they offered their member states a platform to advance further and faster in areas of deeper integration in contrast to the constraints of the wider and slower GATT system (WTO, 2011) . This second wave of regionalism effectively ran out of steam oncethe serious threat of a disintegrating multilateral system did not materialize after all. The Uruguay Round ended successfully in 1994 against all odds, culminating in the genesis of the WTO.
The most recent wave of PTAs has been gathering force over the course of the 21 st century. This time though, it was not only propelled by the Western economic powerhouses but also involved several Asian nations which had previously counted amongst the fiercest proponents of multilateralism and non-discrimination (WTO, 2011 , Maggi, 2014 . Their conversion rests upon an underlying process of progressively intertwining trade and investment flows on the grounds of regional and sub-regional production networks, including major Asian economies such as Japan, China, India and South Korea (Aggarwal et al., 2005 , Katada et al., 2008 . In addition, joint conferences of the nowadays ten ASEAN countries with China, South Korea and Japan (ASEAN plus Three) have taken place since 1997, spawning bilateral AFTA agreements with those three key Asian nations (Lester and Mercurio, 2009, Brzoska, 2016) . The US did not fall short of bilateral negotiations during this period, either, arranging PTAs with plenty of nations all across the globe, e.g. Singapore, South Korea, Australia, Jordan, Bahrain, Chile, Morocco, Oman, Peru, Panama and Colombia (Pomfret, 2006) .
Obviously, there is a movement beyond the traditional concept of regional integration among neighboring countries towards a multitude of bilateral treatieswhich even transcend continental boundaries (Bouzas, 2005 , Erixon, 2013 . This spread of cross-regional partnerships reflects the circumstances that many conceivable intra-regional links have already been exhausted (Fiorentino et al., 2007) . It is moreover the utter dismay over the Doha's Round deadlock why major trading powers contemplated the socalled "Mega-Regionals" -TPP (Trans-Pacific Partnership), TTIP (Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership) and RCEP (Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership) -as a more expedient path for dictating their own terms on international trade outside the WTO's sphere of influence (Bown, 2017) . In brief, those "megadeals" were meant to act as a surrogate of an entire liberalized world trade system because of the tremendous difficulties in reaching the latter. If the EU and the US agreed on rules in the statutes of a potential TTIP, I anticipate that other countries would then be implicitely compelled to accept those as well in order not to renounce trade with these two major economic areas. Considering Mr. Trumps critical stance on international trade -especially his most recent announcement of imposing protectionistic tariffs on steel and aluminum imports and above all his willingness to wage a trade war against Europewe strongly doubt that a TTIP is likely to materialize before the end of his presidency, tough. A thouroughly legitimate assumption considering that putting the latter on indefinite hold as well as entirely backing out of the TTP constituted one of his first offical acts.
In a nutshell, "this most recent "wave" of regionalism covers a much wider network of participants -including bilateral, plurilateral and crossregional initiatives -and encompasses countries at different levels of economic development -including "developed-developed", "developingdeveloping", and "developed-developing" alliances" (WTO, 2011) . Emerging countries have in fact contributed significantly to this third phase of PTA activity, as their pattern of participation evolved from a constantly cumulating number of corresponding deals struck with developed countries (North-South agreements) to an accelerating emergence of South-South agreements. While the former and the latter accounted for nearly 60 % and negligible 20 % of all PTAs registered in the late 1970s, respectively, these two proportions have been virtually turned upside down in the meanwhile (WTO, 2011) . Likewise, the share of North-North agreements has fittingly dropped from 30 % to 10 % at present.
Conclusions
The indisputable success of the European integration project also prompted other regions of the world to follow suit, exemplified by NAFTA, Mercosur or ASEAN. On the other side of coin, the surge of regional blocs since the 1960s also unveiled -apart from spurring political separatism, being currently witnessed in several European countriessome considerable drawbacks. They literally cultivated free trade inside but remained protectionist vis-à-vis the outside, thereby impeding the progress of the multilateral trade system. Protectionism indeed rates among the preeminent causes for the stagnating liberalization process under the auspices of the WTO. But also the soaring number of WTO member states accompanied by their incompatible interests, the shifting balance of powers in the world economy, the ambitious agenda spanning over 20 diverse issues and, in particular, the single undertaking approach emerged as the Doha's Round "stumbling blocks". From my point of view, the disastrous outcome of the Buenos Aires Round in December 2017 has proved once again that a final conclusion of the negotiations is highly improbable to materialize in the near future.
The utter dismay over the Doha's Round deadlock has provoked countries to opt for alternative for a outside the WTO in their endeavor to expedite far-reaching trade liberalization. To our mind, this urge for deeper integration most certainly represents one of the central root causes for the most recent wave of PTAs which has been gathering force over the course of the 21st century. Another possible explanation for this phenomenon is the vast economic growth in Asia that put this part of the world in the limelight and elicited a race for market. This did not only result in several bilateral trade agreements amongst these Asian economies but also yielded plenty of partnerships with countries from beyond the region. Most importantly, it also fueled the unprecedented expansion of global production networks whose effective operability strongly relies on the intergovernmental alignment of WTO+ and WTO-X policy areas.
Overall, "(t)he emphasis of international cooperation has apparently changed (…), as there is a seeming momentum shift away from the multilateral and nondiscriminatory framework of the GATT/WTO in favor of discriminatory arenas under new PTAs, and away from negotiations emphasizing shallow integration and toward negotiations stressing increasingly deep integration" (Bagwell et al., 2016) . It essentially puts the WTO's raison d'être under increasing critical scrutiny.
